The international conflict regarding the climate change by Stauvermann, P. J.
Механізм регулювання економіки, 2010, № 3, Т. 1 27 
ЧАСТИНА 1 
 













The international conflict regarding the climate change 
 
The article deals with the development of possible mechanism for international conflict of climate change 
solving. Thus author proposes the creation of international tax agency that would measure the production of 
all natural resources, which are responsible for the CO2 emissions. Also all firms who are buying these 
resources must be taxed and revenues must be distributed taking the emissions per head into account.  
Keywords: climate change, CO2 emissions, ecological conflicts, taxes, international tax 
administration, natural resources. 
I Introduction 
The Potsdam Institut fuer Klimafolgenforschung (2009), the leading institute in Germany for 
research on the climate change estimated that in the period between 2000–2050 the emissions of 
CO2 equivalents should not exceed in aggregate 1000 billion tons of CO2 equivalents worldwide 
to avoid an average worldwide temperature increase of more than 2 degree Celsius [2]. Until 
2009 the World emitted just around one third of it. That means if we want to meet the 2 degree 
Celsius target, the world must reduce its CO2 emissions by 50% of the level of 1990. Or in other 
words the world must restrict its emissions for the next 41 years to a maximum of just around 
700 billion tons of CO2 equivalents. The problem is that the emissions per head of CO2 
equivalents and GDP per head are very different in all countries. In all countries we observe a 
direct correlation between CO2 emissions and production, even that some countries are more 
emission-intensive than others. Here we define emission-intensity as relation between GDP 
measured in monetary units and CO2 emissions measured in physical units. The resulting 
problem is then that bargaining processes like in Copenhagen are very complicate to solve. We 
know that the CO2 emissions should not exceed a specific limit
2, we know that the number of 
population of some countries is huge like in China or India and of others very low like in Fiji or 
Kiribati. However, the emissions per head are very different mostly depending on the richness of 
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2 Here I assume 700,000 billion tons, at least the number plays no role for the arguments here.  
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a country; the total emissions could be very high in high-populated countries, even that their 
GDP per head is low. In some low-populated countries the emissions per head are high, but the 
total emissions are low. The situation in Copenhagen was like in an ultimatum game [3], which 
is well-known in game theory. Here we want to try to find an explanation for the disastrous 
results of the Copenhagen summit in 2009. In the next chapter we explain the theory and some 
facts to analyze the problems. Then we will try to explain how to find a way out of the problems. 
II Facts and Model 
To make the analysis as easy as possible we take only a few countries into account, which 
could be seen as representatives for the rest of the world. The following countries are relevant 
here, Russian Federation, Germany, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, USA, China and Fiji. 
Here we look only at the values of the total CO2 emissions and CO2 emissions per head, CO2 
emissions per monetary unit, percentage of the total world emissions of CO2 and the rank of 
the country taken the GDP per head into account. All numbers are for the year 2006.  
 







per head (tons) 
CO2 emissions 
per PPP-$ in 
kg 
Rank; GDP 
per head in 
PPP-$ 
% of the total 
world 
emissions 
China 6,103,493 4.00 1.03 127 21.5 
USA 5,752,289 18.99 0.45 10 20.2 
Russia 1,564,669 10.92 0.86 73 5.5 
Germany 805,090 9.74 0.30 36 2.8 
South Korea 475,248 9.89 0.44 50 1.7 
Fiji 1,610 2.01 0.0005 158 <0.1 
UAE 139,553 32.85 0.64 17 0.5 
 
We observe, that the total emissions of the countries are very different, and the emissions 
per head also, where there is no correlation between these numbers. For example the total 
emissions of the UAE are relative low, but the emissions per head very high. Contrary to that 
the total emissions of South Korea are four times higher than in the UAE; the emissions per 
head just around four times lower as in the UAE. The explanation is that the numbers of 
population of both countries are very different. What indicator should be taken into account in 
a bargaining process to lower the total emissions or better to reach the millennium goals? A 
huge country like the USA emits the same amount of total emissions of China, but per head 
just around five times more than in China. Would it be just to argue that an American 
inhabitant is allowed to emit five times more CO2 than an inhabitant of China? If we take into 
account the emissions of the past the relationship would be multiplied. For some reasons it 
seems to be unrealistic that the developed countries would accept that the emissions from 
1989 and earlier will be accepted as an argument in negotiations. The problem is that the 
countries must split up a cake which is fixed, or some countries like Fiji will be strongly 
damaged; a lot of Fijian islands would vanish forever. Would it be a just idea that threatened 
countries should bear the burden of climate change? On the other hand the rich countries like 
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Germany, UAE and USA would have to reduce either its production or to invest a huge 
amount of income to decrease their emission intensity. The problem is that the efforts of 
countries to reduce the emissions like the USA must be much higher than in China or in South 
Korea. What would be a fair solution, ignoring that the power of the USA is much higher than 
Fiji for example. It is like in elections every human should have the same rights, what would 
mean that every human would have the right to emit as much as all other humans. What does 
that mean? The share of the cake must be equally distributed to all humans. The US 
Americans cannot expect that they should have the right to emit more than Russians. So the 
task is to divide the remaining the 700 billion tons of CO2 equivalents over 40 years equally. A 
further problem is how to deal with the population growth? Shall the amount of living people 
decrease if new humans are born? Or shall it be the case that emissions rights are inheritable? 
A thinkable approach would be that all humans should get property rights for the amount of 
emissions they are allowed to emit. Of course also the trade with these emissions rights should 
be allowed. That would mean a Fijian would able to sell emission rights to an US-American. 
This sounds to be a very complicate mechanism, even that the trade of emission rights is not new 
and partly introduced regarding CO2 emissions in Europe between firms. However, this 
approach bears some risks, at first it could lead to speculation in emission rights, what can be 
observed in the present in the European market for emission rights. The rich countries could try 
to exploit poor countries regarding emission rights. For example by making development 
depended on a compensation measured in CO2 certificates. If we think about the first years after 
the end of the USSR, something similar happened with firm shares. After the distribution of the 
shares to the workers, some smart businessmen from Moscow bought all shares for a very low 
price. The reasoning is that most Russian workers did not know what to do with their shares. The 
consequence was the rise of huge oligopolies, which it not very good for market economy as we 
all know. The same can be expected from countries where the literacy rate is very low.  
An easier mechanism would be that an international tax agency would measure the 
production of all natural resources, which are responsible for the CO2 emissions. In a next step 
all firms who are buying these resources must be taxed. If this would be possible the prices for 
gasoline, heating, coal, plastic products would rise and the aggregate demand for these products 
would decrease. In a third step the tax revenue must be distributed in some way, my proposal 
would be that the taxes could be redistributed in the following way. All countries, taking the 
emissions per head into account, which are emitting less than the allowed level of emissions, 
would get a higher share of the tax revenue, which should be proportional to the CO2 savings.  
The consequence would be that share of countries like the USA or UAE would be low or 
zero, where probably countries like China or Fiji would receive a relative high share of the tax 
revenue. Please note the allowed level of per head emissions should be independent of new 
generations. To make this point clear, the allowed total emissions will be fixed today. This 
would have the effect that governments would have an incentive that the population will not 
grow and remain constant, because population growth is one of the most important 
environmental problems. To make this point more clear, if a country would have 10 
inhabitants each of them are allowed to emit 100 units of CO2, then the allowed level for the 
country would be 1000 units of CO2. If the population would increase later on to 20, than the 
allowed level of emissions is still 1000 units and each of its habitants would have than only a 
level of 5 units. The logic behind this mechanism is that only parents directly influence the 
number of children and the government has only a little influence on it. If such a mechanism 
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Overall, this taxation of the use of natural resources would have some interesting effects. At 
first the CO2 life-cycle would become interesting for firms and would lead to the introduction of 
environmental substitutes or alternatives, because of the high costs of environmental-unfriendly 
goods. Secondly, the firms would have an interest to improve repair services, because services 
would become relatively cheaper than new products for the consumer. Secondly, national 
governments would have an interest to enhance investments in environmental friendly 
infrastructure, technologies, to give incentives for consumers and firms to reduce the use of 
natural resources like coal, oil and so on. Thirdly, poor countries like Fiji or India would receive 
money for such investments. Fourthly, what the governments would do in their country and for 
what they would spend the additional money, would only be decided by the national 
governments. The advantage is that the regional possible measures are very different. For 
example, in Fiji there are no heaters systems because of the high temperature. At least the it is 
relatively easy to measure of all natural resources, which are producing CO2 equivalents. It is not 
necessary to know the tax rate ex ante; it can be adjusted until the optimal tax rate level is 
reached. This makes the system very flexible. However, this mechanism seems to have some 
good characteristics, which could help to solve not only the climate change problem. It helps also 
to reduce population growth and to increase the economic growth without harming the climate. It 
would create jobs in the service sector and high technology firms. And the mechanism would be 
fair and just. In principle it is a kind of Pigou tax combined with a distribution mechanism.  
III Conclusions 
We know that the Copenhagen conference 2009 was more or less a disaster, if we look at 
the results. However, if the humankind is convinced that the combusting of oil, gas, coal and 
so on, then a solution must be found in the nearest future. If we will fail than a lot of island 
countries will vanish and many coastal areas will be damaged. The first problem of the 
bargaining process in Copenhagen was that the targets with respect to reduction of CO2 were 
different for a lot of countries. For example the targets of the European Union were high and 
the targets of the USA were low. The most threatened countries in the third world were 
ignored. The first thing what to do, is to think no longer only nationalistic. At first it must be 
discussed what is a fair and just distribution of the burden, which is caused by the CO2 
reductions. If we really think that all humans are equal, consequently every human should 
have the right to emit as much as all other humans. Of course that would mean that developed 
countries have to bear the huge share of the burden, while other countries have to bear a small 
share. Additionally, we proposed an international tax mechanism, which has many advantages. 
It relatively easy to implement it, the polluter-pay principle is applied; the national integrity is 
not influenced, of course except the tax. Poor countries would gain from the tax revenue and 
also all other countries, which would do something to lower their CO2 emissions.  
All countries would have an incentive to invest in environmental friendly technologies. 
The indirect effects would be that governments have an incentive to lower the national fertility 
rate if it is too high, the service sector will gain and the number of working places increased, 
probably the world income will rise.  
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Міжнародні еколого-економічні конфлікти, пов’язані зі зміною клімату 
У даній статті аналізуються організаційно-економічні механізми та інструменти вирішення 
проблеми зміни клімату на міжнародному рівні. Автором для аналізу вирішення суперечностей 
щодо емісій СО2, запропоновано вибірку з декількох країн: Німеччина, Російська Федерація, США, 
Південна Корея, ОАЕ, Китай та Фіджі, що умовно представляють все різноманіття протиріч в 
світі, пов’язаних зі зміною клімату. Так, наприклад, сумарні викиди СО2 в Південній Кореї в чотири 
рази більші, ніж в ОАЕ, проте на душу населення викиди в ОАЕ також в чотири рази більші, ніж в 
Південній Кореї. Існуючі конфлікти між країнами зі значними викидами на душу населення та 
країнами зі значними сумарними викидами і низькими подушними викидами призвели до того, що 
існуючі механізми та переговори в Копенгагені в 2009 р. не принесли очікуваних результатів.  
Автор стверджує, що справедливе вирішення проблеми квот та обмежень викидів по 
країнам полягає в забезпеченні однакових прав на забруднення для усіх людей планети. Це 
означає, що дозволи на забруднення повинні бути рівномірно розподілені між усіма економічними 
агентами і «американці не зможуть мати право більше забруднювати, ніж росіяни». 
В роботі автором запропоновано механізм екологічного оподаткування, суть якого полягає в 
створенні міжнародного агентства, яке буде вимірювати та контролювати видобуток 
природних ресурсів, пов’язаних зі створенням вуглекислого газу. Наступним кроком є 
впровадження обов’язкового оподаткування для всіх фірм, які купують ці ресурси. Автор 
розраховує, що ціни на бензин, опалення, вугілля та вироби з пластику внаслідок оподаткування 
будуть рости, і сукупний попит на ці продукти буде зменшуватися. Всі податкові надходження 
повинні бути розподілені між країнами, приймаючи до уваги викиди на душу населення. Так 
країни з меншими викидами на душу населення і викидами менше допустимого рівня, будуть 
отримувати більш високу частку податкових надходжень. Також висувається гіпотеза 
розподілу податкових надходжень шляхом встановлення пропорційних коефіцієнтів по країнам, 
що впроваджують ресурсо- та енергозберігаючі технології по зменшенню емісії СО2. 
У цілому використання оподаткування природних ресурсів буде мати важливі економічні 
ефекти. По-перше, життєвий цикл СО2 буде впливати на господарську діяльність підприємств і 
стимулюватиме провадженню екологічних замінників та альтернативних джерел через високі 
витрати на «екологічно недружні» товари. По-друге, зросте економічна зацікавленість в 
розвитку та поліпшенні ремонтних послуг, оскільки послуги стануть порівняно дешевшими, ніж 
створення нових продуктів для споживачів. По-третє, національні уряди будуть мати інтерес 
для збільшення обсягу інвестицій в екологічну інфраструктуру, технології, та стимулювання 
споживачів і фірм, з метою скорочення використання природних ресурсів. По-четверте, такі 
бідні країни, як Фіджі та Індія будуть отримувати гроші для екологічних інвестицій. 
Ключові слова: зміна клімату, емісія СО2 , екологічні конфлікти, податкові надходження, 
міжнародна податкова адміністрація, природні ресурси. 
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Международные эколого-экономические конфликты, связанные с изменением климата 
В статье рассматриваются научные подходы к решению международных конфликтов 
связанных с изменением климата. Автор предлагает создание международной налоговой 
администрации, которая будет заниматься расчетом добычи природных ресурсов, 
использование которых приведет к эмиссиям CO2. Фирмы, которые используют такого рода 
ресурсы, должны платить налоговые пошлины, а сами поступления перераспределяются между 
странами зависимости от уровня эмиссий СО2 на душу населения.  
Ключевые слова: изменение климата, эмиссия СО2 , экологические конфликты, налоговые 
пошлины, международная налоговая администрация, природные ресурсы. 
